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1 Introduction
Beginning with the work of Vickrey (1945) and Mirrlees (1971), economists have used
models of optimal income taxation for policy prescriptions and for the normative
analysis of government behavior. By now, a great deal of progress has been made
on the issues of existence and characterization of optimal income taxes.1 A third
issue, budget balancedness, has received much less attention. The purpose of this
paper is to address this issue within the context of a model in which both income
taxes and public goods are chosen endogenously. We make two contributions to the
theory budget balancedness and optimal income taxation. First, assuming conditions
su¢cient for existence of a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism,
we show that if agents’ preferences satisfy an extended notion of single crossing we call
capacity constrained single crossing (i.e., a condition implied by the classical Spence-
Mirrlees condition), then existence of a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods
mechanism that is budget balancing is guaranteed. Second, we show that existence
of a budget balancing, Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism is
also guaranteed if capacity constrained single crossing is replaced by the assumption
that set of agent types contains no atoms. The atomless condition will be satis…ed
automatically if, for example, the distribution of agent types is given by a continuous
density function.
What is intriguing about the problem of budget balancedness is that despite the
fact that agent preferences are strictly decreasing in income taxes, a budget surplus
can occur even under a second best Pareto optimal income tax and public goods
mechanism. Moreover, any attempt to spend the surplus by increasing public goods
levels may in fact exacerbate the problem - because such increases may alter agents’
marginal rates of substitution (income for tax liability) in ways that induce agents to
choose even higher levels of income and tax liability (e.g., public goods and income
may be complementary “goods”).2 Thus, the anomaly of the government burning
money to maintain optimality can occur.
The existence of a Pareto optimal and budget balancing income tax and public
goods mechanism depends critically upon the shape of the tax and income possibilities
set (i.e., the set of all possible aggregate income and tax revenue pairs attainable under
some implementable income tax and public goods mechanism). Here, we introduce
the notion of tax convexity. We say that the tax and income possibilities set is
tax convex if any convex combination of attainable aggregate tax revenue is also
attainable. Our two main contributions to the theory of budget balancedness and
optimal income taxation are consequences of three fundamental results related to
1See Myles (1995) for a survey. Also, see Berliant and Page (2001) for results on existence.
2Note, however, that if agent utility functions are additively separable in public goods, then
agents’ marginal rates of substitution (income for tax liability) will not be altered by increasing
public goods quantities. In our model, we allow for more general trade-o¤s between income and
tax liability. Since the focus of our model is on this trade-o¤, we do not assume that agent utility
functions are additively separable.
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tax convexity. First, we show that if the tax and income possibilities set is tax
convex, then there exists an optimal income tax-public goods mechanism that is
budget balancing. Second, we show that if the capacity constrained single crossing
condition is satis…ed, then the tax and income possibilities set is tax convex. Third,
we show that if the atomless condition is satis…ed, then again the tax and income
possibilities set is tax convex.
As in Berliant and Page (2001), here we proceed by transforming the income tax-
public goods mechanism design problem to an equivalent problem of optimal menu
design (e.g., see Hammond (1979), Holmstrom (1984) and Page (1992)). This trans-
formation is the key ingredient which allows us to establish the connection between
tax convexity and budget balancedness, the connection between single crossing and
tax convexity, and …nally the connection between the atomless condition and tax
convexity. The validity of this transformation rests upon another fundamental result
- a result characterizing all implementable income tax-public goods mechanisms in
terms of revenue feasible menu and public goods pairs. Here, we shall state (and
prove in the appendix) this characterization result, and for the sake of the reader, we
shall restate our result on the equivalence of the income tax-public goods mechanism
design problem and the menu design problem (i.e., Theorem 2 in Berliant and Page
(2001)).
In analyzing the problem of budget balancedness, we allow both the income tax
and the public goods levels to be chosen endogenously. This di¤erentiates our model
from the classical model of optimal income taxation where public goods levels are
…xed (e.g., see Mirrlees (1971)). Moreover, while we allow public goods levels to vary,
we treat only the pure public goods case and focus on nonlinear income taxation.
This di¤erentiates our model from recent models of taxation and the provision of
local public goods (see, for example, Conley and Wooders (2001)). We view our work
here as providing a foundation for future investigations of the role played by budget
balancedness in multi-jurisdictional competition via income taxes and local public
goods. Our work on nonlinear income taxation also contrasts with the literature
on linear commodity taxation, as represented for example by Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971). In a more recent paper in this literature, Konishi (1995) has analyzed the
problem of Pareto-improving linear commodity taxation under an exogenously given
nonlinear income tax.
The model we develop, while similar to models found in the principal-agent liter-
ature (e.g., Mirrlees (1976), Holmstrom (1979)), di¤ers from the classical principal-
agent model in several important respects. First, rather than having a single agent,
there are many agents, the taxpayers. Second, in our model once the agent has chosen
an action, he faces no uncertainty. Speci…cally, in our model each agent chooses a
level of income rather than, as is the case in the principal-agent model, a probability
distribution over income. Third, while the principal-agent literature often restricts
to linear or quasi-linear objective or utility functions, the focus of the optimal in-
come tax model is on the trade-o¤ between labor/leisure and consumption (i.e., the
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trade-o¤ between income and tax liability), so we allow more general preferences.
Finally, in our model there are no voluntary participation (or individual rationality)
constraints. These constraints are replaced by a …nancing constraint which requires
that the government choose an income tax mechanism that funds the public goods.
Thus, formally our model and the principal-agent model are quite di¤erent.
In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3, we present our main results and
we discuss the intuition behind our results. In Sections 4-6, we present our formal
analysis of budget balancedness and optimal income taxation. Thus, Section 4-6 are
technical in nature. All proofs are gathered in Section 6.
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2 The Model
2.1 Basic Ingredients
We begin by specifying the set K of all feasible (non-bankrupting) income and tax
liability pairs. Let Y := [0;m] and T := [s;m] for some numbers m > 0 and s · 0 .
De…ne K as follows:
K := f(y; ¿ ) 2 Y £ T : y ¸ ¿g : (1)
For any pair (y; ¿) 2 Y £ T , y denotes income and ¿ denotes the corresponding tax
liability. Note that if s < 0, then tax liabilities can be negative, indicating transfer
payments. Equipped with the standard Euclidean metric, de, K is compact.
Let W denote the set of agent types, usually called ability or wage rates in the
literature, and equip W with a ¾-…eld § and a …nite measure ´(¢) de…ned on §. For
E 2 §, ´(E) is the number of agents of type w 2 E .
In the standard optimal income tax model, the upper bound on labor supply
(hours worked) in combination with the wage rate imply an individual-speci…c, ex-
ogenous upper bound on the income an individual can earn. This constraint, which
we call the capacity constraint, is rarely made explicit in the literature. The reason
for this is that most of the literature focuses on necessary conditions for optimal
income taxes rather than budget balancedness. Here we must make this constraint
formal. To begin, for each w 2W let m(w) denote the maximum earned income level
attainable by a type w agent. We will assume that the function m(¢) satis…es the
following assumptions:
[A-1]
(1) For all w 2W; 0 <m(w) · m:
(2) The function m(¢) is (§; B((0;m]))-measurable.3
De…ne the set Y (w) as follows:
Y (w) := fy 2 Y : 0 · y · m(w)g : (2)
The interval Y (w) is the subset of income levels in Y := [0;m] attainable by an agent
of type w. We will refer to the interval-valued mapping, w ! Y (w), as the income
correspondence. Note that the income correspondence has closed convex values with
0 2 Y (w) for all w 2 W and that by [A-1](1) (i.e., 0 < m(w) for all w 2 W ) the
interior of the income interval Y (w) is nonempty for all w 2W .
Example 1 (Agent Types and Maximum Attainable Income): Suppose the set of
tax liabilities is given by an interval T = [0;m] and the set of agent types is given
3B((0;m]) denotes the Borel ¾ -…eld of the interval (0; m]. The function m(¢) is (§; B((0; m])-
measurable i¤
fw 2 W : m(w) 2 Eg 2 §
for E 2 B((0; m]).
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by an interval of positive ability parameters W = [a; b] ½ R++. For each income
and tax liability pair (y; ¿ ) 2 K, let labor be given by l = yw , and consumption
by c = y ¡ ¿.4 Letting L > 0 denote the maximum amount of labor that can be
supplied by any agent type, we have l 2 [0; L] and y 2 [0; wL]. Thus m(w) := wL
and Y (w) := [0; wL].
Suppose now that there are k public goods z := (z1; : : : ; zk) 2 Rk+. We shall
assume that the set of all possible public goods vectors is given by the nonnegative
orthant Rk+ and that for each vector of public goods z 2 Rk+, h(z) is the (nonnegative)
cost of providing public goods z. Also, we shall assume that
[A-2]
(1) The public goods cost function h(¢) : Rk+ ! R+
is lower semicontinuous.5
(2) There exists M 2 R such that for all z 2 Rk+ with kzk >M ,
h(z) >m ¢ ´(W ):
Recall that m ¢ ´(W ) bounds from above the aggregate amount of income that
can be generated by all agents. By [A-2](2), the cost h(z) of producing public goods
z 2 Rk+ of magnitude kzk > M exceeds this bound on aggregate income. Thus,
under assumption [A-2](2) for public goods z of magnitude kzk > M, even if income
m ¢ ´(W ) were transferred to the government as tax revenue, it would be insu¢cient
to …nance public goods z.
2.2 income tax-public goods Mechanisms
An income tax-public goods mechanism is a 3-tuple (y(¢); t(¢); z) where y(¢) : W ! Y
is a direct mechanism mapping from agent types into income, t(¢) : Y ! T is an
indirect mechanism mapping from income into tax liabilities, and z 2 Rk+ is a vector
of public goods. The quantity y(w) is the income level chosen by a type w agent,
while t(y(w)) is the corresponding tax liability given income tax function t(¢).
Let M (W;Y) denote the set of all (§; B(Y))-measurable functions y(¢) : W ! Y,
and M(Y;T) the set of all (B(Y); B(T))-measurable functions t(¢) : Y ! T.6 We
4Thus gross labor income is given by y = l ¢ w.
5The function h(¢) : Rk+ ! R+ is lower semicontinuous if zn ! z implies that
lim inf
n
h(zn) ¸ h(z):
6B(T) denotes the Borel ¾-…eld in T and B(Y) denotes the Borel ¾-…eld in Y. A function
y(¢) : W ! Y is (§; B(Y))-measurable i¤
fw 2 W : y(w) 2 Eg 2 §
for E 2 B(Y). (B(Y); B(T))-measurability is de…ned in a similar manner.
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shall take as the feasible set of direct income functions the set S(Y (¢)) given by
S(Y (¢)) := fy(¢) 2M (W;Y) : y(w) 2 Y (w) for all w 2Wg : (3)
Thus, a direct income function, y(¢) : W ! Y, is feasible if and only if it is (i)
measurable and (ii) 0 · y(w) · m(w) for all w 2W .
For each y 2 Y, let
T(y) := f¿ 2 T : s · ¿ · yg : (4)
We shall take as the feasible set income tax functions the set S(T(¢)) given by
S(T(¢)) := ft(¢) 2M(Y;T) : t(y) 2 T (y) for all y 2 Yg : (5)
Thus, an income tax function, t(¢) : Y ! T, is feasible if and only if it is (i) measurable
and (ii) s · t(y) · y for all y 2 Y .
2.3 Agents’ Utility Functions
For each agent type w 2W , de…ne
K(w) := f(y; ¿) 2 K : y 2 Y (w)g ;
and let u(w; ¢; ¢; ¢) : K(w)£ Rk+ ! R denote the agent’s utility function de…ned over
3-tuples of income, tax liability, and public goods, (y; ¿; z) 2 K(w) £ Rk+. We will
assume agents’ utility functions satisfy the following assumptions:
[A-3]
(1) (continuity): For each w 2W , u(w; ¢; ¢; ¢) is continuous
on K(w) £ Rk+:
(2) (measurability): For each (y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 S(Y (¢))£ S(T(¢))£ Rk+;
u(¢; y(¢); t(y(¢); z) is §-measurable.7
(3) (integrability): There exists a ´-integrable function Ã(¢) :W ! R
such that for each (y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 S(Y (¢))£ S(T(¢))£ Rk+;ju(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z)j · Ã(w) a.e.[´].8
(4) (monotonicity): For each (w; y; z) 2 W £ Y (w) £ Rk+;
u(w; y; ¢; z) is strictly decreasing on T(y):
7The function u(¢; y(¢); t(y(¢); z) is §-measurable i¤ for any Borel measurable subset E of the real
numbers R,
fw 2 W : u(w; y(w); t(y(w);z) 2 Eg 2 §:
8Ã(¢) is ´-integrable if Ã(¢) : W ! RZ
W
jÃ(w)j d´(w) < 1:
We thank Guy Laroque for pointing out the need for assumption [A-3](3).
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We shall also assume that agents’ preferences are such that leisure is essential;
that is, we shall assume that in order for an agent to achieve a utility level at or
above his reservation level, income must be accompanied by some positive amount of
leisure. Stated formally, we have:
[A-4] (essentiality of leisure): For all agent types w 2W ,
u(w; 0; 0; z) > u(w;m(w); ¿ ; z) for all (¿; z) 2 T(m(w))£ Rk+.
Under [A-4], if a type w agent chooses the maximum level of income possible
for his type, m(w), then no matter what the tax liability ¿ or level of public goods
z, the agent’s utility, u(w;m(w); ¿ ; z), is less than his reservation level, u(w; 0; 0; z).
Thus, in order for a type w agent to achieve a utility level at or above his reservation
level, the agent must choose an income level strictly less than the maximum level
attainable for his type - and therefore, the agent must choose a positive level of
leisure. Assumption [A-4] thus guarantees that a type w agent’s optimal income
choice will be in the income interval given by
fy 2 Y : 0 · y < m(w)g ;
a subset of the feasible income interval Y (w) := fy 2 Y : 0 · y · m(w)g.
Figure 1 below depicts the indi¤erence curves corresponding to a type w agent,
given public goods vector z, for a utility function, u(¢; ¢; ¢; ¢), satisfying assumption
[A-4]. Note that in Figure 1 the agent’s utility function, u(w; ¢; ¢; z), is de…ned over
income and tax liability pairs in
K(w) := f(y; ¿) 2 K : y 2 K(w)g .
More importantly, note that in Figure 1 indi¤erence curve 1, passing through the
income and tax liability pair (m(w); s), lies everywhere below (in terms of preference
direction) indi¤erence curve 2, passing through the income and tax liability pair (0; 0).
Thus, the preferences illustrated in Figure 1 satisfy assumption [A-4]. Note that in
Figure 1, the vertical axis, the ¿ axis, is the tax liability axis, while the horizontal
8
axis, the y axis, is the income axis.
(m(w),0) (m,0)
(0,s)
(0,0)
(m,m)
(m,s)
(m(w),s)
(0,m)
indifference curve 1
indifference curve 2
y
Figure 1
Example 2 (A Utility Function Satisfying the Essentiality of Leisure): As in
Example 1, suppose the set of tax liabilities is given by an interval T = [0;m] and
the set of agent types is given by an interval of positive ability parameters W =
[a; b] ½ R++. For each income and tax liability pair (y; ¿ ) 2 K , let labor be given by
l = yw , and consumption by c = y ¡ ¿ . Letting L > 0 denote the maximum amount
of labor that can be supplied by any agent type. As before, we have l 2 [0; L] and
y 2 [0; wL] (i.e., m(w) := wL and Y (w) := [0; wL]). Suppose now that agents have
preferences represented by a continuous utility function, v(e; c; z); de…ned over leisure
e = L¡ l = L¡ yw 2 [0; L], consumption c = y¡¿ 2 [0; wL], and public goods z 2 Rk+,
given by
u(w; y; ¿; z) = v(L¡ yw ; y ¡ ¿; z)
=
¡
L¡ yw + "
¢
(°(y ¡ ¿) + ") (z + ") for (y; ¿ ) 2 K(w):
9
Note that utility function u(¢; ¢; ¢; ¢) satis…es [A-3]. Moreover, u(¢; ¢; ¢; ¢) will satisfy
essentiality of leisure ([A-4]), if for all (¿; z) 2 T(m(w)) £ [0;M ];
v(0; 0; z) > v(
m(w)
w ;m(w) ¡ ¿ ; z) = v(L;wL¡ ¿ ; z) : (*)
It is easy to check that if the parameter ° is such that ° < 1, then (*) will be satis…ed.
2.4 Tax Design Problems with Public Goods
We suppose that the government does not know each agent’s type but can observe
each agent’s income and thus compute the resulting tax liability under any income
tax function.
To begin, let ¹(¢) be a …nite measure de…ned on the measurable space of agent
types (W;§), equivalent to the measure ´(¢).9 The measure ¹(¢) represents one pos-
sible welfare weighting scheme for agent types.10
The tax design problem with public goods can be stated as follows:
max
(y(¢);t(¢);z)
Z
W
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z)d¹(w) (6)
subject to the constraints:
(y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 S(Y (¢)) £ S(T (¢)) £ Rk+; (7)
for each w 2W and y 2 Y (w)
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z) ¸ u(w; y; t(y); z); (8)Z
W
t(y(w))d´(w) ¸ h(z) (9)
Expression (6) employs a utilitarian welfare function as is standard in the optimal
income tax literature. Expression (7) is the feasibility constraint, while the inequalities
given by (8) are the incentive compatibility constraints. Note that depending on
the number of agent types, there can be uncountably many incentive compatibility
constraints. Let ª denote the set of feasible, incentive compatible income tax-public
goods mechanisms. That is, ª is the subset of mechanisms, (y(¢); t(¢); z), contained
in S(Y (¢))£ S(T(¢))£ Rk+ satisfying inequalities (8).
9¹ and ´ are equivalent if they have the same sets of measure zero. Thus, ¹ and ´ are equivalent
if ¹ is absolutely continuous with respect to ´ and ´ is absolutely continuous with respect ¹.
10For a utilitarian welfare function, changing the measure ¹ can also be viewed as changing the
cardinal representation of the underlying ordinal utilities. We thank John Ledyard and Leo Hurwicz
for reminding us of this.
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The inequality constraint given in expression (9) is the …nancing constraint. It
requires that any feasible income tax-public goods mechanism (y(¢); t(¢); z) generate
total tax revenues su¢cient to cover the cost of providing public goods z. Denote
by ¦ the subset of income tax-public goods mechanisms, (y(¢); t(¢); z), contained in
S(Y (¢))£ S(T(¢))£ Rk+ satisfying inequalities (9).
The tax design problem with public goods can be stated compactly as
max
(y(¢);t(¢);z)2ª\¦
Z
W
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z)d¹(w): (10)
2.5 De…nitions: Implementation, Optimality, and Budget
Balancedness
De…nition 1 (Implementation): We say that an income tax-public goods mechanism
(y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 S(Y (¢)) £ S(T (¢)) £ Rk+
implements income tax function t(¢) and …nances public goods z if and only if
(y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 ª\ ¦:
De…nition 2 (Second Best Pareto Optimality): We say that a income tax-public
goods mechanism
(y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 S(Y (¢)) £ S(T (¢)) £ Rk+
is Pareto optimal if and only if there does not exist another income tax-public goods
mechanism (y 0(¢); t0(¢); z0) 2 S(Y (¢))£ S(T(¢))£ Rk+ such that
u(w; y0(w); t0(w); z0) ¸ u(w; y(w); t(w); z) a.e.[´]; (11)
and
u(w; y 0(w); t0(w); z0) > u(w; y(w); t(w); z) for all w 2 E, E 2 § and ´(E) > 0: (12)
De…nition 3 (Budget Balancedness): We say that a income tax-public goods mech-
anism
(y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 S(Y (¢)) £ S(T (¢)) £ Rk+
satis…es budget balancedness if and only ifZ
W
t(y(w))d´(w) = h(z): (13)
The following Proposition gives su¢cient conditions for Pareto optimality. The
proof is straightforward.
11
Proposition 1 (Su¢cient Conditions for E¢ciency): If the mechanism
(y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 S(Y (¢)) £ S(T (¢)) £ Rk+
solves the design problem ((6)-(9)) for some …nite measure ¹ equivalent to the measure
´, then it is Pareto optimal.
By Proposition 1, any income tax-public goods mechanism (y¤(¢); t¤(¢); z¤) 2
ª \ ¦ solving the design problem ((6)-(9)) is Pareto optimal. Moreover, since
(y¤(¢); t¤(¢); z¤) 2 ¦, the income tax function t¤(¢) …nances the vector of public goods
z¤ under optimal income function y¤(¢). Berliant and Page (2001) show that problem
((6)-(9)) has a solution. Here we address the more di¢cult question: Does there exist
a Pareto optimal income tax-public goods mechanism satisfying budget balancedness?
3 Main Results on Optimality and Budget Bal-
ancedness
By Theorem 1 in Berliant and Page (2001), under assumptions [A-1] to [A-4] there
exists a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism, provided the set
of incentive compatible and budget feasible mechanisms, ª \ ¦, is nonempty. In
Theorems 1 and 2 below, we identify additional conditions - capacity constrained
single crossing and the atomless condition - each of which guarantees the existence
of a budget balancing, Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism.
3.1 Capacity Constrained Single Crossing and Budget Bal-
ancedness
Our …rst result states that if agents’ utility functions satisfy the capacity constrained
single crossing condition, then there exists a Pareto optimal income tax-public goods
mechanism satisfying budget balancedness.
To begin, assume that,
[A-5]
½
the set of agent types W is given by
a subset of the real numbers equipped with the usual ordering.
We say that agents’ utility functions satisfy the capacity constrained single crossing
condition
[A-6]
8>>><>>>:
if for all z 2 Rk+, w0 > w implies that
(1) K(w) µ K(w0); and
(2) for all (y; ¿ ) and (y 0; ¿ 0) in K(w) with y0 > y;
(a) u(w; y0; ¿ 0; z) ¸ u(w; y; ¿; z) ) u(w0; y 0; ¿ 0; z) ¸ u(w0; y; ¿ ; z); and
(b) u(w; y 0; ¿ 0; z) > u(w; y; ¿ ; z) ) u(w0; y0; ¿ 0; z) > u(w0; y; ¿; z):
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Example 3 (A Utility Function Satisfying the Capacity Constrained Single Cross-
ing): As in Example 2, suppose that the set of tax liabilities is given by an interval
T = [0;m] and that the set of agent types is given by an interval of positive ability
parameters W = [a; b] ½ R++. Recall that for each income and tax liability pair
(y; ¿ ) 2 K , labor is given by l = yw , while consumption is given by c = y ¡ ¿ . Now
suppose that agents have preferences represented by a twice continuously di¤eren-
tiable utility function, v(e; c; z); de…ned over leisure e = L¡ l = L ¡ yw 2 [0; L],
consumption c = y¡ ¿ 2 [0; wL], and public goods z 2 Rk+, given by
u(w; y; ¿; z) = v(L¡ y
w
; y ¡ ¿ ; z):
As in Example 2, v(¢; ¢; ¢) might take the speci…c form,
v(L¡ y
w
; y ¡ ¿ ; z) =
³
L¡ y
w
+ "
´
(°(y ¡ ¿) + ") (z + ") for (y; ¿ ) 2 K(w):
Also, recall from Example 2 that labor l = yw 2 [0; L] and income y 2 [0; wL] where
L > 0 is the maximum amount of labor that can be supplied by any agent type (i.e.,
m(w) := wL and Y (w) := [0; wL]).
If v(¢; ¢; ¢) satis…es the following derivative conditions
(i)
@v
@e
> 0,
@v
@c
> 0; (ii)
@2v
@e2
· 0, and (iii) @
2v
@e@c
¸ 0,
then
u(w; y; ¿; z) = v(L¡ y
w
; y¡ ¿ ; z)
satis…es capacity constrained single crossing [A-6]. To see this consider the following:
Let (y; ¿) and (y0; ¿ 0) in K(w) be such that y0 > y, and suppose that
v(L¡ y0w ; y 0 ¡ ¿ 0; z) ¸ v(L ¡ yw ; y ¡ ¿; z); (¤)
but for some w0 > w
v(L¡ y0w0 ; y0 ¡ ¿ 0; z) < v(L¡ yw0 ; y ¡ ¿ ; z): (¤¤)
It follows from (¤) and (¤¤) and the continuity of the utility function that for some
w 2 [w;w0]
v(L¡ y
0
w
; y0 ¡ ¿ 0; z) = v(L¡ y
w
; y¡ ¿ ; z): (¤ ¤ ¤)
Since L¡ y0w < L¡ yw , (¤ ¤ ¤) and @v@c > 0 imply that y0 ¡ ¿ 0 > y ¡ ¿. Given @v@e > 0
and @2v@e2 · 0, we know that
@v
@e
(L¡ y
0
w
; y ¡ ¿ ; z) ¸ @v
@e
(L ¡ y
w
; y ¡ ¿ ; z) for all w:
13
Also, since @2v@e@c ¸ 0, y0 ¡ ¿ 0 > y ¡ ¿ implies that
@v
@e
(L ¡ y
0
w
; y0 ¡ ¿ 0; z) ¸ @v
@e
(L¡ y
0
w
; y ¡ ¿; z) for all w:
Therefore,
@v
@e
(L¡ y
0
w
; y0 ¡ ¿ 0; z) ¸ @v
@e
(L¡ y
w
; y ¡ ¿; z) for all w,
contradicting (¤¤):
Suppose now that
v(L¡ y0w ; y 0 ¡ ¿ 0; z) > v(L¡ yw ; y ¡ ¿; z);
but for some w0 > w
v(L ¡ y0w0 ; y0 ¡ ¿ 0; z) · v(L¡ yw0 ; y ¡ ¿; z):
Again, we have for some w 2 [w;w0]
v(L¡ y
0
w
; y 0 ¡ ¿ 0; z) = v(L¡ y
w
; y ¡ ¿; z):
Repeating the argument above, we obtain a contradiction.
Thus, if agents’ utility functions are given by
u(w; y; ¿; z) = v(L¡ yw ;y ¡ ¿ ; z); w 2 [a; b];
and if the derivative conditions, (i), (ii), and (iii), above are satis…ed, then capacity
constrained single crossing, [A-6], holds. Moreover, if v(¢; ¢; ¢) is of the form,
v(L ¡ y
w
; y ¡ ¿; z) =
³
L¡ y
w
+ "
´
(°(y¡ ¿ ) + ") (z + ")
with 0 < ° < 1, then the essentiality of leisure, [A-4], also holds (see Example 2).
Our main result on capacity constrained single crossing and budget balancedness
is the following:
Theorem 1 (The Capacity Constrained Single Crossing Condition and Budget Bal-
ancedness):
Suppose that [A-1]-[A-4] hold and suppose that ª\ ¦ 6= ;.
If the set of agent types W is given by a subset of the real numbers equipped with
the usual ordering, that is if [A-5] holds, and if the capacity constrained single crossing
condition [A-6] holds, then there exists an optimal income tax-public goods mechanism
that is budget balancing. In particular, for any …nite measure ¹ de…ned on the space
of agent types (W;§) equivalent to ´ there exists a mechanism (y¤(¢); t¤(¢); z¤) 2 ª\¦
maximizing
Z
W
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z)d¹(w) over ª \ ¦
such that Z
W
t¤(y¤(w))d´(w) = h(z¤):
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3.2 The Atomless Condition and Budget Balancedness
A subset of agent types E 2 § is an atom in the measure space (W;§; ´) if ´(E) > 0
and for all F 2 § such that F µ E, either ´(F ) = 0 or ´(E ¡ F ) = 0. We say that
(W;§; ´) satis…es the atomless condition if
[A-7] (W;§; ´) contains no atoms.
Example 4 (Densities and the Atomless Condition): Suppose the measure space
of agent types, (W;§; ´), is speci…ed as follows: W = Rm, § is the Lebesgue ¾-…eld,
and ´ is speci…ed via a density function f ; that is, for E 2 §,
´(E) =
Z
E
f(w)d¸(w);
where ¸ is Lebesgue measure on Rm. Then (W;§; ´) contains no atoms - and there-
fore, (W;§; ´) satis…es the atomless condition.
Our main result on the atomless condition and budget balancedness is the follow-
ing:
Theorem 2 (The Atomless Condition and Budget Balancedness):
Suppose that [A-1]-[A-4] hold and suppose that ª\ ¦ 6= ;.
If the measure space of agent types (W;§; ´) contains no atoms, so that [A-7]
holds, then there exists an optimal income tax-public goods mechanism that is budget
balancing. In particular, for any …nite measure ¹ de…ned on the space of agent types
(W;§) equivalent to ´ there exists a mechanism (y¤(¢); t¤(¢); z¤) 2 ª \ ¦
maximizing
Z
W
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z)d¹(w) over ª \ ¦
such that Z
W
t¤(y¤(w))d´(w) = h(z¤):
3.3 The Intuition
3.3.1 Pictures of the Problem and the Solution
In order to better understand the problem of budget balancedness and the intuition
behind our results, we begin by considering the tax and income possibility set (TIPS).
This set contains all possible aggregate income and tax revenue pairs attainable under
some incentive compatible income tax and public goods mechanism, given a particular
income tax function and public goods pair. For example, Figure 2 below depicts the
tax and income possibilities set, the TIPS, corresponding to income tax function and
public goods pair (t(¢); z), where each point in the set is generated by some income
tax and public goods mechanism (y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 ª: Thus, given (t(¢); z) the aggregate
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income and tax pairs, (Y; T), contained in TIPS are generated by varying the direct
income function, y(¢), so that (y(¢); t(¢); z) is incentive compatible (i.e., contained in
ª).
the tax and incom e
possibilities se t
T
Y
(Y2,T2)
(Y1,T1)
Figure 2
In Figure 2, the vertical axis, the T axis, is the aggregate tax revenue axis, while the
horizontal axis, the Y axis, is the aggregate income axis.
In Figure 2, corresponding to the point (Y 1; T 1) there is a mechanism (y1(¢); t(¢); z) 2
ª such that
Y 1 =
Z
W
y1(w)d´(w) and T 1 =
Z
W
t(y1(w))d´(w),
and corresponding to (Y 2; T 2) there is a mechanism (y2(¢); t(¢);z) 2 ª such that
Y 2 =
Z
W
y2(w)d´(w) and T 2 =
Z
W
t(y2(w))d´(w).
The problem of budget balancedness arises if the cost of providing public goods
z, given by h(z), is such that for all aggregate income and tax revenue pairs, (Y; T ),
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contained in TIPS either
T < h(z) or h(z) < T .
Figure 3 depicts the problem.
the tax and income
possibilities set
T
Y
(Y2,T2)
h(z)
T2
(Y1,T1)
T1
Figure 3
In Figure 3, there does not exist an aggregate income and tax pair, (Y; T), contained
in TIPS such that T = h(z). Note that the mechanism (y2(¢); t(¢); z) generating
(Y 2; T 2) satis…es the …nancing constraint. Thus, (y2(¢); t(¢); z) 2 ª\¦. However, the
mechanism (y1(¢); t(¢); z) generating (Y 1; T 1) does not satisfy the …nancing constraint.
Thus, (y1(¢); t(¢); z) =2 ¦, and therefore, (y1(¢); t(¢); z) =2 ª \ ¦. Finally, note that
if (y(¢); t(¢); z) =2 ¦ for all direct income functions, y(¢), such that (y(¢); t(¢); z) is
incentive compatible (i.e., contained in ª), then the income tax function and public
goods pairs (t(¢); z) would not be a viable solution candidate for the optimal income
tax problem.
With these pictures in mind, it is easy to see that if the projection of the tax
and income possibilities set, TIPS, onto the aggregate income tax axis is convex, then
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the problem of budget balancedness goes away. We call this projection condition tax
convexity. Thus, if the TIPS corresponding to an income tax function and public
goods pair (t(¢); z) is tax convex, then budget balancedness can be achieved under
some direct income function y(¢) such that (y(¢); t(¢); z) is incentive compatible. This
is the intuition underlying Theorem 4 below. Figure 4 depicts a tax convex TIPS
corresponding to income tax function and public goods pair (t(¢); z).
the tax and income
possibilities set
T
Y
(Y,T)
h(z)
Tu
Tl
Figure 4
Note that in this case the projection of the TIPS onto the aggregate income tax axis
(the T -axis) is given by the interval [T l; T u], and is therefore convex. Also note that
the projection of the TIPS onto the aggregate income axis (the Y -axis) is not convex.
Moreover, note that for the aggregate income and tax pair (Y; T) contained in the
TIPS and depicted in Figure 4, T = h(z). Thus for this given income tax function
and public goods pair, (t(¢); z), there is some direct income function y(¢) such that
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(y(¢); t(¢); z) is incentive compatible and such that
Y =
Z
W
y(w)d´(w) and T =
Z
W
t(y(w))d´(w) = h(z).
3.3.2 The Intuition Behind the Solution
We identify two conditions on the primitives of the model guaranteeing tax convexity
of the TIPS: (i) the capacity constrained single crossing condition [A-6] (see Theorem
5), and (ii) the atomless condition [A-7] (see Theorem 6). The key ingredient which
allows us to see the connection between single crossing and tax convexity and be-
tween atomlessness and tax convexity is a transformation of the optimal income tax
problem ((6)-(9)) from a mechanism design problem to a menu design problem (see
Corollary 1; also see Hammond (1979), Holmstrom (1984) and Page (1992)). It is in
the transformed problem - the menu design problem - that we are able to identify
conditions su¢cient for tax convexity. The validity of this transformation rests upon
a fundamental result characterizing all income tax-public goods mechanisms in ª\¦
in terms of revenue feasible menu and public goods pairs (see Theorem 3).
The basic idea is straightforward: rather than have the government choose an
optimal income tax-public goods mechanism (y¤(¢); t¤(¢); z¤) 2 ª \¦, instead, in the
transformed problem, the government chooses an optimal menu-public goods pair
and delegates choice from the menu to the agents. Each menu consists of a set of
income and tax liability pairs. Figure 5 below illustrates the idea of a menu, as well
as the choice problem faced by a type w agent given menu and public goods pair
(C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+. Here, ¤ denotes the feasible set of menus. In Figure 5, the vertical
axis, the ¿ axis, is the tax liability axis, while the horizontal axis, the y axis, is the
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income axis.
(m(w),0) (m,0)
(0,s)
(0,0)
(m,m)
(m,s)
(m(w),s)
(0,m)
y
menu C
(yl(w), l(w))
(yu(w), u(w))
lower boundary of
menu C
indifference curve
Figure 5
Given that utility is strictly decreasing in taxes, all agents, no matter what their
types, will choose an optimal income and tax liability pair on the lower boundary of
menu C . Letting ©(w;C; z) denote the best responses (i.e., the optimal income and
tax liability choices) of a type w 2W, given menu-public goods pair (C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+,
we have in Figure 5,
©(w;C; z) =
©
(yl(w); ¿ l(w)); (yu(w); ¿ u(w))
ª
;
where each pair, (yl(w); ¿ l(w)) and (yu(w); ¿u(w)), is on the lower boundary of menu
C and on the same type w agent’s indi¤erence curve.
Note that no income and tax liability pairs along the lower boundary of menu
C between (yl(w); ¿ l(w)) and (yu(w); ¿u(w)) are chosen by type w agents. Thus,
there is a gap in tax revenue from type w agents between ¿ l(w) and ¿u(w) - and
depending on the distribution of agent types, such gaps can cause tax convexity to
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fail. We show in Theorem 5 below that if capacity constrained single crossing is
satis…ed, then such gaps can be eliminated, without altering the utility of any agent
type and hence without breaking incentive compatibility. In particular, we show that
tax revenue gaps can be eliminated by replacing menu C with a menu D where the
lower boundary of menu D between (y l(w);¿ l(w)) and (yu(w); ¿ u(w)) is given by the
indi¤erence curve passing through (yl(w); ¿ l(w)) and (yu(w); ¿u(w)). Figure 6 depicts
the new menu D equivalent to menu C under capacity constrained single crossing.
(m(w),0) (m,0)
(0,s)
(0,0)
(m,m)
(m,s)
(m(w),s)
(0,m)
y
menu D
(yl(w), l(w))
(yu(w), u(w))
lower boundary of
menu D
Figure 6
Under menu D, a type w agent’s best responses, ©(w;D; z), include (yl(w); ¿ l(w))
and (yu(w); ¿ u(w)), as well as all the income and tax liability pairs, (y; ¿ ) between
(yl(w); ¿ l(w)) and (yu(w); ¿ u(w)) on the indi¤erence curve containing (yl(w); ¿ l(w))
and (yu(w); ¿u(w)). Note that a type w agent’s optimal utility under menu-public
goods pair (C; z) 2 ¤£Rk+ is equal a type w agent’s optimal utility under menu-public
goods pair (D; z) 2 ¤£Rk+. More importantly, note that under (D; z) 2 ¤£Rk+ there
is no longer a tax revenue gap between ¿ l(w) and ¿u(w). In the proof of Theorem 5,
we show that, in general, under capacity constrained single crossing, a menu which
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produces tax revenue gaps, for example menu C in Figure 5, can always be replaced
by a menu which does not produce tax revenue gaps, for example menu D in Figure 6
- without altering agents’ incentives or diminishing potential tax revenues. Moreover,
we show in the proof of Theorem 5 that the TIPS corresponding to a menu-public
goods pair which generates no tax revenue gaps is tax convex. Together, Theorem 4
and Theorem 5 imply Theorem 1.
In Theorem 6 we show that if the measure space of agent types is atomless (i.e.,
contains no atoms), then the TIPS corresponding to any menu-public goods pair is
convex - and therefore tax convex. Here the basic intuition is that without atoms
(i.e., without rare and signi…cant agent types) the set of types is su¢ciently rich and
varied to guarantee that aggregate tax revenue gaps (as well as aggregate income
gaps) get …lled in via the optimizing behavior of agents. Together, Theorem 4 and
Theorem 6 imply Theorem 2.
In the remaining sections of the paper, we carry out the formal analysis of the
optimal income tax problem. First, we transform the optimal income tax problem
from a mechanism problem to a menu problem (Theorem 3 and Corollary 1). Next,
within the context of the transformed problem, we show that tax convexity implies
budget balancedness (Theorem 4). Finally, we show that capacity constrained single
crossing implies the tax convexity of the TIPS (Theorem 5), and we show that the
atomless condition implies convexity of the TIPS (Theorem 6).
4 Transforming the Optimal Income Tax Problem:
From Mechanisms to Menus
4.1 Menus and Revenue Feasibility
4.1.1 Menus
To begin, let Pf(K) denote the collection of all nonempty closed subsets of
K := f(y; ¿ ) 2 Y £ T : y ¸ ¿g :
Since K is a compact metric space, Pf (K) equipped with the Hausdor¤ metric h is
also a compact metric space (Berge (1963)).
Since the government cannot control or restrict an agent’s income choice, any
income and tax liability menu C 2 Pf(K) chosen by the government must be such
that projY(C) = Y, where projY(C) denotes the projection of the closed set C ½ Y£T
onto Y. Hence menu choice must be restricted to the subset of menus ¤ given by
¤ := fC 2 Pf(K) : projY(C) = Yg : (14)
The set ¤ is nonempty (e.g., take the 45 degree line in Y£T ) and closed with respect
to the Hausdor¤ metric.11 Thus, (¤; h) is a compact metric space.
11 In particular, it is easy to show that if fCngn ½ ¤ converges to C 2 Pf (K) under the metric h,
22
4.1.2 Delegated Choice and the Best Response Mapping
Given a particular menu and public goods pair (C; z) 2 ¤ £ Rk+ chosen by the gov-
ernment, the resulting delegated choice problem for agents is given by
max
(y;¿)2C\K(w)u(w; y; ¿; z): (15)
For each agent type w 2W , choice problem (15) has a solution. Let
bu(w;C; z) := max
(y;¿ )2C\K(w)u(w; y; ¿; z); (16)
and
©(w;C; z) := f(y; ¿ ) 2 C \K(w) : u(w; y; ¿ ; z) ¸ bu(w;C; z)g : (17)
Given menu and public goods pair (C; z) 2 ¤ £ Rk+, bu(w;C; z) is the maximal
level of utility attainable by a type w agent, while ©(w;C; z) is the set of income and
tax liability pairs from which the type w agent must choose in order to attain utility
level bu(w;C; z). Thus, the mapping w! ©(w;C; z) is the best response mapping.
Proposition 2 (Continuity Properties of the Maximal Utility Function and the Best
Response Mapping):
(1) Under assumption [A-3], bu(w; ¢; ¢) is continuous on ¤£ Rk+ for each w 2 W
(with respect to the product metric) and bu(¢; C; z) is §-measurable on W for each
(C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+.
(2) ©(w;C; z) is nonempty and compact for each (w;C; z) 2W £ ¤£ Rk+: More-
over, ©(w; ¢; ¢) is upper semicontinuous on ¤ £ Rk+ for each w 2W (with respect to
the product metric) and ©(¢; ¢; ¢) is §£B(¤)£B(Rk+)-measurable on W £¤£ Rk+.12
Under the assumption of essentiality of leisure (i.e.,[A-4]), The proof of Proposition
2 follows directly from Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 in Page (1992).
Let
§(C; z) := f(y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 M(W;Y) £M(W;T) : (y(w); ¿(w)) 2 ©(w;C; z) 8 w 2Wg :
(18)
§(C; z) is the set of all measurable selections from the best response mapping,
w! ©(w;C; z), given menu, public goods pair (C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+: By the Kuratowski-
Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999), p. 567),
then projY(C) = Y.
12B(¤) denotes the Borel ¾-…eld in the compact metric space (¤; h) and B(Rk+) the Borel ¾-…eld
in Rk+ . ©(¢; ¢; ¢) is § £ B(¤) £ B(Rk+)-measurable i¤ for each closed subset E of Y £ T, the subset
of 3-tuples (w; C; z) in W £ ¤ £ Rk+ such that
©(w; C; z) \ E 6= ;
is contained in § £ B(¤) £ B(Rk+) (see Himmelberg (1975)).
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for any (C; z) 2 ¤ £ Rk+, §(C; z) is nonempty. Because each measurable selec-
tion, (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C;z), is de…ned directly on the set of agent types W , each
(y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C; z) is a direct mechanism. Thus, §(C; z) is the set of all incentive
compatible direct mechanisms given menu public goods pair (C; z) 2 ¤ £ Rk+.
4.1.3 Revenue Feasibility
De…nition 4 (Revenue Feasibility): A menu and public goods pair (C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+
is revenue feasible if there exists a direct mechanism (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C; z) such thatZ
W
¿ (w)d´(w) ¸ h(z): (19)
Let R, a subset of ¤ £ Rk+, denote the set of all revenue feasible menu, public
goods pairs.
Proposition 3 (Compactness of the Set of Revenue Feasible Menu, Public Goods
Pairs): R is a compact subset of ¤£ Rk+.
4.2 The Equivalence of Mechanisms and Menus
Theorem 3 (The Equivalence of Mechanisms and Menus):
Suppose [A-1]-[A-4] hold.
1. Given any income tax-public goods mechanism (y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 ª\¦, there exists
a pair (C; z) 2 R such that
(y(w); t(y(w))) 2 ©(w;C; z) for all w 2W:
2. Given any pair (C; z) 2 R, there exists a income tax-public goods mechanism
(y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 ª \ ¦ such that
(y(w); t(y(w))) 2 ©(w;C; z) for all w 2W:
Corollary 1 below (a restatement of Theorem 2 in Berliant and Page (2001))
establishes the equivalence of the income tax-public goods mechanism design problem
given by
max
(y(¢);t(¢);z)2ª\¦
Z
W
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z)d¹(w); (20)
and the menu design problem given by
max
(C;z)2R
Z
W
bu(w;C; z)d¹(w): (21)
Corollary 1 also describes how the optimal income tax function can be constructed
from the optimal menu, public goods pair, and conversely, how the optimal menu,
public goods pair can be constructed from the optimal income tax function.
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Corollary 1 (The Equivalence of the Mechanism Problem and the Menu Problem):
Suppose [A-1]-[A-4] hold. Let ¹ be any …nite measure equivalent to the measure
´. Then the income tax-public goods mechanism design problem (20) has a solution if
and only if the menu design problem (21) has a solution. In particular, the following
statements are true:
(1) If the income tax-public goods mechanism (y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 ª\ ¦
maximizes
Z
W
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z)d¹(w) over ª \ ¦;
then the pair (cl[Gr(t(¢)]; z), where cl[Gr(t(¢)] is the closure of the graph of the income
tax function t(¢) and z is the public goods vector in Rk+, is contained in R and
maximizes
Z
W
bu(w;C; z)d¹(w) over R:
(2) If the menu-public goods pair (C; z) 2 R
maximizes
Z
W
bu(w;C; z)d¹(w) over R;
then the mechanism (y(¢); t(¢); z) constructed in (a) and (b) below is contained in
ª \ ¦ and
maximizes
Z
W
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z)d¹(w) over ª \ ¦:
(a) y(¢) is the direct income function and z the vector of public goods corresponding
to a direct income tax-public goods mechanism
(y(¢); ¿ (¢); z) 2M (W;Y)£M (W;T) £ Rk+
such that (y(w); ¿ (w)) 2 ©(w;C; z) for all w 2W andZ
W
µ
¿ (w)¡ h(z)
´(W )
¶
d´(w) ¸ 0;
(b) t(¢) : Y ! T is the (B(Y); B(T))-measurable function given by
t(y) := minf¿ : (y; ¿ ) 2 Cg for all y 2 Y:
Note that given (C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+, we have for any direct mechanism (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2
§(C; z)
u(w; y(w); ¿ (w); z) = bu(w;C; z) for all w 2W:
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Moreover, for the unique income tax function, t(¢) : Y ! T constructed from menu
C 2 ¤ in accordance with part 2(b) of Corollary 1, we have for any direct mechanism
any direct mechanism (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C; z)
(y(w); t(y(w))) = (y(w); ¿ (w)) for all w 2W:
Because the objective function,
(C; z) !
Z
W
bu(w;C; z)d¹(w);
in the menu design problem is continuous, the compactness of the constraint set R
implies that the menu design problem has a solution (see Theorem 3 in Berliant and
Page (2001)), and thus implies via Corollary 1 that the original income tax-public
goods mechanism design problem ((6)-(9)) has a solution (see Theorem 1 in Berliant
and Page (2001)).
5 The Problem of Budget Balancedness
5.1 Tax Convexity and Aggregate Income and Tax Revenue
The equivalence of the mechanism design problem and the menu design problem
established in Corollary 1 allows us to approach the problem of budget balancedness
via the simpler menu design problem. We begin by considering the best response
mapping, w! ©(w;C; z), corresponding to the menu, public goods pair (C; z). The
closed set ©(w;C; z) is the type w agent’s set of optimal income and tax liability
choices given (C; z). Since for all w 2 W and all (C; z) 2 ¤ £ Rk+, ©(w;C; z) ½ K ,
and since K is a compact subset of R2, the collection of best response mappings,©
©(¢; C; z) : (C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+
ª
;
is ´-integrably bounded.13
Now consider the set-valued mapping
(C; z) !
Z
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w); (22)
13Thus, there exists a ´-integrable function
g(¢) : W ! R
such that for any menu public goods pair (C;z) 2 ¤ £ Rk+ ;
k(y; ¿)k · g(w)
for all w 2 W and (y;¿ ) 2 ©(w; C; z):
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where Z
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w) :=
½Z
W
f (w)d´(w) : f(¢) = (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C; z)
¾
:
The set
R
W ©(w;C; z)d´(w) is the integral of the best response mapping ©(¢; C; z).
Moreover,
R
W ©(w;C; z)d´(w) is the set we have referred to in Subsection 3.3.1 as
the tax and income possibilities set (TIPS). Our next proposition summarizes the
properties of this set, as well as how this set varies with changes in the menu and
public goods pair.
Proposition 4 (1) For each (C; z) 2 ¤ £ Rk+,
R
W ©(w;C; z)d´(w) is a nonempty,
compact subset of R2. Moreover, if the measure space of agent types (W;§; ´) is
atomless, then Z
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w) is convex.
(2) The mapping (C; z) ! RW ©(w;C; z)d´(w) is upper semicontinuous on ¤£Rk+.
The integral of the best response mapping w! ©(w;C; z);Z
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w);
contains all aggregate income and tax revenue pairs, (Y; T ); attainable under menu
public goods pair (C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+ via some incentive compatible direct mechanism
(y(¢); ¿ (¢)) 2 §(C; z):
In particular,
if (Y; T) 2 RW ©(w;C; z)d´(w), then there exists
(y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C; z) such that
Y =
R
W y(w)d´(w) and T =
R
W ¿(w)d´(w):
Moreover, for the income tax function, t(¢) : Y ! T, uniquely determined by menu
C 2 ¤ via the construction described in part 2(b) of Corollary 1, we have
(y(w); ¿(w)) = (y(w); t(y(w))) for all w 2W;
and thus,
T =
Z
W
t(y(w))d´(w):
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De…nition 5 (Tax Convexity): We say that the tax and income possibilities set,Z
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w);
is tax convex if for all (Y 1; T 1) and (Y 2; T 2) contained in
R
W ©(w;C; z)d´(w) and
for all
T¸ := (1¡ ¸)T 1 + ¸T 2, ¸ 2 [0; 1],
there exists Y¸ such that
(Y¸; T¸) 2
Z
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w):
If
R
W ©(w;C; z)d´(w) is convex, then it is automatically tax convex. However, as
illustrated in Figure 4 above, the converse is not true.
5.2 Tax Convexity and Budget Balancedness
Our next result on budget balancedness states that if the tax and income possibili-
ties set,
R
W ©(w;C
¤; z¤)d´(w), is tax convex at the optimal menu public goods pair
(C¤; z¤) 2 ¤ £ Rk+, then there exists an optimal income tax-public goods mechanism
that is budget balancing.
Theorem 4 (Tax Convexity and Budget Balancedness):
Suppose [A-1]-[A-4] hold and let (C¤; z¤) 2 R be a solution to the menu design
problem given by
max
(C;z)2R
Z
W
bu(w;C; z)d¹(w):
If
R
W ©(w;C
¤; z¤)d´(w) is tax convex, then there exists an optimal income tax-public
goods mechanism,
(y¤(¢); t¤(¢); z¤) 2 ª \ ¦;
corresponding to (C ¤; z¤) 2 R that is budget balancing. In particular, there exists a
income tax-public goods mechanism (y¤(¢); t¤(¢); z¤) 2 ª\ ¦;
maximizing
Z
W
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z)d¹(w) over ª \ ¦
such that Z
W
t¤(y¤(w))d´(w) = h(z¤):
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.By Theorem 3 in Berliant and Page (2001), the menu design problem has a solu-
tion, say (C¤; z¤) 2 R. By Theorem 4, tax convexity of the tax and income possibili-
ties set at the optimal menu-public goods pair (C ¤; z¤) 2 R is su¢cient to guarantee
the existence of an optimal income tax-public goods mechanism (y¤(¢); t¤(¢); z¤) 2
ª\¦ satisfying budget balancedness. We now identify two conditions, capacity con-
strained single crossing and the atomless condition, and show that these conditions
guarantee tax convexity.
5.3 Two Conditions Su¢cient for Tax Convexity
5.3.1 The Capacity Constrained Single Crossing Condition
Capacity constrained single crossing essentially ensures tax convexity, but the con-
nection between single crossing and tax convexity is subtle.
Theorem 5 (Capacity Constrained Single Crossing and Tax Convexity):
Suppose [A-1]-[A-4] hold. Moreover, suppose that the set of agent types W is a
subset of the real numbers equipped with the usual ordering and that capacity con-
strained single crossing holds, so that [A-5] and [A-6] hold. Then given any menu
public goods pair (C; z) 2 ¤ £ Rk+, there exists another menu D 2 ¤ such that
(1) bu(w;C; z) = bu(w;D; z) for all w 2W;
(2)
R
W ©(w;D; z)d´(w) is tax convex,
and
(3)
R
W ©(w;C; z)d´(w) µ
R
W ©(w;D; z)d´(w):
Let (C¤; z¤) 2 R be the solution to the menu design problem (21) guaranteed
by Theorem 3 in Berliant and Page (2001). Under [A-5] and [A-6], it follows from
Theorem 5 that there exists another menu D¤ 2 ¤ such that (D¤; z¤) 2 R also solves
the menu design problem (21), and more importantly, such that
R
W ©(w;D
¤; z¤)d´(w)
is tax convex. The existence of an optimal, budget balancing income tax and public
goods mechanism, (y¤(¢); t¤(¢); z¤) 2 ª\¦, corresponding to (D¤; z¤) 2 R then follows
from Theorem 4. Thus, the proof of Theorem 1 follows from Theorem 3 in Berliant
and Page (2001) and Theorems 4 and 5 above.
5.3.2 The Atomless Condition
The atomless condition also ensures tax convexity. The connection between atom-
lessness and tax convexity is quite direct.
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Theorem 6 Suppose [A-1]-[A-4] hold. Moreover, suppose that the measure space of
agent types (W;§; ´) is atomless, so that [A-7] holds. Then given any menu public
goods pair (C; z) 2 ¤ £ Rk+,Z
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w) is tax convex.
The proof of Theorem 6 follows immediately from part (1) of Proposition 4 which
states that
if the measure space of agent types (W;§; ´) is atomless, thenR
W ©(w;C; z)d´(w) is convex for all (C; z) 2 ¤ £ Rk+:
In many applications, the atomless condition will be satis…ed automatically (see Ex-
ample 4).
Let (C ¤; z¤) 2 R be the solution to the menu design problem (21) guaranteed by
Theorem 3 in Berliant and Page (2001). Under [A-7] it follows from Theorem 6 thatR
W ©(w;C
¤; z¤)d´(w) is tax convex. The existence of an optimal, budget balancing
income tax and public goods mechanism, (y¤(¢); t¤(¢); z¤) 2 ª \ ¦, corresponding to
(C¤; z¤) 2 R then follows from Theorem 4. Thus, the proof of Theorem 2 follows
from Theorem 3 in Berliant and Page (2001) and Theorems 4 and 6 above.
6 Proofs
6.1 Proof of Proposition 3
IfR = ;, then the proposition is true. Suppose R 6= ;. First, note that by assumption
[A-2](2) and the compactness of Pf(K), R is bounded. The proof will be complete if
we can show that R is closed. Consider the net tax contribution function (w;C; z) !
¾(w;C; z) given by
(w;C; z) ! ¾(w;C; z) := max
½
¿ ¡ h(z)
´(W )
: (y; ¿ ) 2 ©(w;C; z)
¾
:
Here, h(z)´(W) is the per capita cost of providing public goods z: The quantity ¾(w;C; z)
is the maximum amount of net per capita tax contribution obtainable from a type
w agent consistent with incentive compatibility. Since ©(w;C; z) ½ K is nonempty
and compact, ¾(w;C; z) is well-de…ned for each (w;C; z) 2W £ ¤ £ Rk+. Moreover,
by Proposition 4.3 in Page (1992), ¾(¢; ¢; ¢) is §£B(¤)£B(Rk+)-measurable and for
each w 2W , ¾(w; ¢; ¢) is upper semicontinuous on ¤ £ Rk+.
Now consider the real-valued function ¢(¢; ¢), de…ned on ¤£ Rk+; given by
¢(C; z) :=
Z
W
¾(w;C; z)d´(w):
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Since ¾(w; ¢; ¢) is upper semicontinuous on ¤ £ Rk+, it follows from Fatou’s Lemma
(see Dudley (1989)) that ¢(¢; ¢) is upper semicontinuous on ¤£ Rk+. Moreover, since
R =
©
(C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+ : ¢(C; z) ¸ 0
ª
;
the closedness of R follows from the de…nition of upper semicontinuity.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3
PART (1): Let (y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 ª \ ¦ and de…ne menu C as follows:
C = cl[Gr(t(¢))];
where cl denotes closure and Gr(t(¢)) is the graph of the income tax function t(¢).
Thus,
Gr(t(¢)) = f(y; ¿ ) 2 Y £ T : ¿ = t(y)g :
First, note that since t(¢) is de…ned on all of Y;
projY[cl[Gr(t(¢))]] = Y:
Note also that since s · t(y) · y for all y 2 Y, s · t(y) · y for all (y; ¿ ) 2 cl[Gr(t(¢))].
Thus, cl[Gr(t(¢))] 2 ¤. Finally, note that since y(w) 2 Y (w) for all w 2W ,
(y(w); t(y(w))) 2 cl[Gr(t(¢))] \K(w) for all w 2W:
Thus, for all w 2W;
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z) · max
(y;¿ )2cl[Gr(t(¢))]\K(w)u(w; y; ¿; z):
Suppose now that for some agent type w0 2W there is an income and tax liability
pair (y0; ¿ 0) 2 cl[Gr(t(¢))] \K(w0) such that
u(w0; y(w0); t(y(w0)); z) < u(w0; y0; ¿ 0; z):
By the essentiality of leisure [A-4], the pair (y0; ¿ 0) is such that y0 < m(w0). Since
(y0; ¿ 0) is in the closure of the graph of t(¢) and since u(w0; ¢; ¢; z) is continuous on
K(w0), there is an income and tax liability pair (y; ¿ ) 2 K(w0) with y < m(w0)
contained in the graph of t(¢) such that
u(w0; y(w0); t(y(w0)); z) < u(w0; y; ¿ ; z):
Thus,
u(w0; y(w0); t(y(w0)); z) < u(w0; y; t(y); z)
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where ¿ = t(y). This contradicts the assumption that (y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 ª (i.e., the
assumption that (y(¢); t(¢); z) is incentive compatible). We must conclude therefore
that for all w 2W;
(y(w); t(y(w))) 2 cl[Gr(t(¢))]\ K(w)
and
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z) = max(y;¿ )2cl[Gr(t(¢))]\K(w) u(w; y; ¿ ; z):
Thus, for C = cl[Gr(t(¢))], we have
(y(w); t(y(w))) 2 ©(w;C; z) for all w 2W .
Moreover, since (y(¢); t(y(¢))) is a measurable selection from ©(¢; C; z) (i.e., since
(y(¢); t(y(¢))) 2 §(C; z)), and sinceZ
W
(t(y(w)) ¡ h(z))d´(w) ¸ 0;
we can conclude that (C; z) = (cl[Gr(t(¢))]; z) 2 R:
PART (2): Let (C; z) 2 R and let (y(¢); ¿ (¢)) 2 §(C; z) be such thatZ
W
(¿ (w) ¡ h(z)) d´(w) ¸ 0:
Thus, the direct tax function w! ¿(w) …nances public goods z and
u(w; y(w); ¿(w); z) = max
(y;¿)2C\K(w)
u(w; y; ¿ ; z) for all w 2W .
Consider the income tax function t(¢) : Y ! T given by
y! t(y) := min f¿ 2 T : (y; ¿) 2 Cg :
Since C is closed, t(¢) is lower semicontinuous, and therefore t(¢) is (B(Y); B(T))-
measurable. Moreover, since
(y; t(y)) 2 C for all y 2 Y;
s · t(y) · y for all y 2 Y:
Claim 1:
(y(w); ¿(w); z) = (y(w); t(y(w)); z) for all w 2 W:
If not, then for some agent type w0 2 W , ¿ (w0) 6= t(y(w0)). Since for all w 2
W , t(y(w)) := minf¿ 2 T : (y(w); ¿) 2 Cg, ¿(w0) 6= t(y(w0)) implies that ¿(w0) >
t(y(w0)): But given monotonicity [A-3](4), ¿(w0) > t(y(w0)) contradicts the fact that
u(w; y(w); ¿(w); z) = max
(y;¿)2C\K(w)u(w; y; ¿ ; z) for all w 2W .
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Thus,
¿(w) = t(y(w)) for all w 2 W;
and thus, Z
W
(t(y(w)) ¡ h(z))d´(w) ¸ 0:
Claim 2: For all w 2W
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z) ¸ u(w; y; t(y); z) for all y 2 Y (w):
Suppose not. Then for some agent type w0 2W and income y00 2 Y (w0);
u(w0; y00; t(y00); z) > u(w0; y(w0); t(y(w0)); z) = u(w0; y(w0); ¿ (w0); z). (*)
Since (y00; t(y 00)) 2 C \K(w); (*) contradicts the fact that
u(w; y(w); ¿(w); z) = max
(y;¿)2C\K(w)
u(w; y; ¿ ; z) for all w 2W .
Thus,
(y(¢); t(¢); z) 2 ª\ ¦;
and
(y(w); t(y(w))) 2 ©(w;C; z) for all w 2W:
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
PART (1): First recall that the set of measurable selectors
§(C; z) := f(y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2M (W;Y) £M(W;T) : (y(w); ¿(w)) 2 ©(w;C; z) 8 w 2Wg
is nonempty. Thus since the collection of best response mappings,©
©(¢; C; z) : (C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+
ª
;
is ´-integrably bounded, it is easy to see that
R
W ©(w;C; z)d´(w) is nonempty and
bounded. To show that
R
W ©(w;C; z)d´(w) is closed, consider a sequence f(Yn; Tn)gn
contained in
R
W ©(w;C; z)d´(w) converging to (Y; T) 2 R2, and let f(yn(¢); ¿ n(¢))gn ½
§(C; z) be a corresponding sequence of measurable selectors such that for all n,
(Yn; Tn) =
µZ
W
yn(w)d´(w);
Z
W
¿ n(w)d´(w)
¶
:
Thus,
(lim
n
Yn; lim
n
Tn) =
µ
lim
n
Z
W
yn(w)d´(w); lim
n
Z
W
¿n(w)d´(w)
¶
:
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Now consider the set-valued mapping,
w! Ls f(yn(w); ¿n(w)g ,
where for each w 2 W , the set Ls f(yn(w); ¿ n(w)g is the set of all limit points of
the sequence f(yn(w); ¿n(w))gn. By Fatou’s Lemma in several dimensions (e.g., see
Artstein (1979)), there exists a§-measurable function, (yf(¢); ¿ f(¢)), and a set N 2 §,
with ´(N) = 0, such that
(yf (w); ¿ f(w)) 2 Ls f(yn(w); ¿ n(w)g for all w 2WnN;
and such that
(Y; T ) =
µZ
W
yf(w)d´(w);
Z
W
¿ f(w)d´(w)
¶
:
Let (y´(¢); ¿´(¢)) be a measurable selection from the mappingw! Ls f(yn(w); ¿n(w)g.
Since this mapping is §-measurable with nonempty closed values, such a selection ex-
ists by the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border
(1999), p. 567). Now de…ne
y(w) := yf (w)IWnN(w) + y´(w)IN(w),
and
¿ (w) := ¿ f(w)IW nN(w) + ¿ ´(w)IN(w);
where IW nN(¢) and IN(¢) are the indicator functions for the sets WnN and N respec-
tively. We have (y(w); ¿ (w)) 2 Ls f(yn(w); ¿n(w)g for all w 2W , and
(Y; T ) =
µZ
W
y(w)d´(w);
Z
W
¿ (w)d´(w)
¶
:
Moreover, since ©(¢; C; z) is closed-valued
Ls f(yn(w); ¿n(w)g µ ©(w;C; z) for all w 2W:
Thus, (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C; z) and thus
(Y; T) =
µZ
W
y(w)d´(w);
Z
W
¿(w)d´(w)
¶
2
Z
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w):
The convexity of
R
W ©(w;C; z)d´(w) whenever (W;§; ´) is atomless follows di-
rectly from a classical result due to Richter (see Hildenbrand (1974), Theorem 3,
page 62).
PART (2): Let f(Cn; zn)gn be a sequence in¤£Rk+ converging to (C; z) 2 ¤£Rk+.
Also, let f(Yn; Tn)gn be a sequence in R2 such that for each n
(Yn; Tn) 2
Z
W
©(w;Cn; zn)d´(w):
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Corresponding to the sequence f(Yn; Tn)gn let f(yn(¢); ¿ n(¢))gn be a sequence of mea-
surable functions such that for each n, (yn(¢); ¿n(¢)) 2 §(Cn; zn) and
(Yn; Tn) =
µZ
W
yn(w)d´(w);
Z
W
¿ n(w)d´(w)
¶
:
Since f(Yn; Tn)gn is bounded we can assume without loss of generality that f(Yn; Tn)gn
converges to some (Y; T) 2 R2. Thus,
(Y; T) = (lim
n
Yn; lim
n
Tn) =
µ
lim
n
Z
W
yn(w)d´(w); lim
n
Z
W
¿ n(w)d´(w)
¶
:
By Fatou’s Lemma in several dimensions and the construction in Part 1 above, there
exists a measurable selection, (y(¢); ¿ (¢)), from the mapping
w! Ls f(yn(w); ¿ n(w)g
such that
(Y; T ) =
µZ
W
y(w)d´(w);
Z
W
¿ (w)d´(w)
¶
:
Moreover, since f(Cnk ; znk)gk converges to (C; z) and since for each w 2W , ©(w; ¢; ¢)
is upper semicontinuous on ¤ £ Rk+,
(ynk(w); ¿nk(w)) 2 ©(w;Cnk ; znk) for all k
and
(limk ynk(w); limk ¿ nk(w)) = (y(w); ¿ (w));
imply that
(y(w); ¿(w)) 2 ©(w;C; z).
Thus, (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C; z), and
(Y; T) =
µZ
W
y(w)d´(w);
Z
W
¿(w)d´(w)
¶
2
Z
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w):
We conclude therefore that
(C; z) !
Z
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w);
is upper semicontinuous.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Suppose that the direct mechanism,
(y0(¢); ¿ 0(¢)) 2 §(C¤; z¤);
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is such that Z
W
¿ 0(w)d´(w) > h(z¤): (23)
Thus, the direct mechanism (y0(¢); ¿ 0(¢)) generates excess revenue given public goods
z¤. Let
(Y 0; T 0) =
µZ
W
y0(w)d´(w);
Z
W
¿ 0(w)d´(w)
¶
:
Now take menu C¤ and for each n let the menu C¤n be de…ned as follows:
(yn; ¿n) 2 C ¤n , (yn; ¿ n) =
µ
y; s _ ¿ ¡ 1
n
¶
for some (y; ¿) 2 C¤.
Here,
s _ ¿ ¡ 1
n
:= max
½
s; ¿ ¡ 1
n
¾
:
Observe that for some subset of agent types E 2 § of positive measure (i.e., with
´(E) > 0 ), we have s < ¿ 0(w) for w 2 E . To see this note that if s = ¿ 0(w) a.e. [´],
this would contradict the fact that by (23)Z
W
¿ 0(w)d´(w) > h(z¤) ¸ s´(W ):
Thus, we have for all n and all w 2 E
s _ ¿ ¡ 1
n
< ¿ 0(w):
Given assumption [A-3](4), monotonicity, we have for all n and all measurable selec-
tors (yn(¢); ¿ n(¢)) from ©(¢; C ¤n; z¤) (i.e., for all (yn(¢); ¿n(¢)) 2 §(C¤n; z¤)),
u(w; yn(w);¿ n(w); z¤)
¸ u(w; y 0(w); s _ ¿ 0(w) ¡ 1n ; z¤)¸ u(w; y 0(w); ¿ 0(w); z¤) for all w 2W;
and
u(w; yn(w);¿ n(w); z¤)
¸ u(w; y 0(w); s _ ¿ 0(w) ¡ 1n ; z¤)
> u(w; y0(w); ¿ 0(w); z¤) for all w 2 E:
(24)
Thus, for all n and all direct mechanisms (yn(¢); ¿n(¢)) 2 §(C¤n; z¤) it must be true
that Z
W
¿ n(w)d´(w) < h(z¤): (25)
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In particular, if for some n Z
W
¿ n(w)d´(w) ¸ h(z¤);
then it follows that (C¤n; z¤) 2 R: Given inequalities (24) this would contradict the
optimality of (C¤; z¤) 2 R.
Observe now that f(C¤n; z¤)gn converges to (C ¤; z¤) and let f(Yn; Tn)gn be a se-
quence in R2 such that for each n
(Yn; Tn) 2
Z
W
©(w;C ¤n; z¤)d´(w):
Since the collection of best response mappings,
©
©(¢; C; z) : (C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+
ª
, is ´-
integrably bounded, we can assume without loss of generality that f(Yn; Tn)gn con-
verges to some (Y; T) 2 R2: By the upper semicontinuity of the mapping
(C; z) !
Z
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w)
on ¤£ Rk+, we have
(Y; T ) 2
Z
W
©(w;C ¤; z¤)d´(w):
Let (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C¤; z¤) be such that
(Y; T ) =
µZ
W
y(w)d´(w);
Z
W
¿ (w)d´(w)
¶
:
By inequality (25), we have Z
W
¿ (w)d´(w) · h(z¤):
Thus, we have
(Y; T ) =
¡R
W y(w)d´(w);
R
W ¿ (w)d´(w)
¢ 2 RW ©(w;C ¤; z¤)d´(w)
with T · h(z¤)
and
(Y 0; T 0) =
¡R
W y
0(w)d´(w);
R
W ¿
0(w)d´(w)
¢ 2 RW ©(w;C ¤; z¤)d´(w)
with T 0 > h(z¤):
Let ¸ 2 [0; 1] be such that
T¸ = (1 ¡ ¸)T 0 + ¸T = h(z¤):
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By the tax convexity of
R
W ©(w;C
¤; z¤)d´(w), there exists aggregate income Y¸ gen-
erating T¸ such that
(Y¸; T¸) 2
Z
W
©(w;C ¤; z¤)d´(w)
with corresponding measurable selector (y¤(¢); ¿¤(¢)) 2 §(C¤; z¤) such that
(Y¸; T¸) =
¡R
W y
¤(w)d´(w);
R
W ¿
¤(w)d´(w)
¢
;
and
T¸ =
R
W ¿
¤(w)d´(w) = h(z¤):
Let t¤(¢) : Y ! T be the income tax function uniquely determined by menu C¤.
By part (2) of Corollary 1 the income tax-public goods mechanism (y¤(¢); t¤(¢); z¤)
constructed from mechanism (y¤(¢); ¿¤(¢); z¤) and menu public goods pair (C¤; z¤) 2 R
is contained in ª \ ¦ and
maximizes
Z
W
u(w; y(w); t(y(w)); z)d¹(w) over ª\ ¦:
Moreover, Z
W
¿ ¤(w)d´(w) =
Z
W
t¤(y¤(w))d´(w) = h(z¤):
6.5 Proof of Theorem 5
(1) First, we will show that given (C; z) 2 ¤£ Rk+, there exists D 2 ¤ such thatbu(w;C; z) = bu(w;D; z) for all w 2W .
The proof will be divided into two parts:
(1) PART 1: Let (C; z) 2 R be given and let (yu(¢); ¿ u(¢)) 2 §(C; z) be such that
y(w) · yu(w) for all w 2W and (y(¢); ¿ (¢)) 2 §(C; z): Also, let (yl(¢); ¿ l(¢)) 2 §(C; z)
be such that y l(w) · y(w) for all w 2 W and (y(¢); ¿ (¢)) 2 §(C; z): Call (yu(¢); ¿u(¢))
and (yl(¢);¿ l(¢)) the maximum and minimum income, incentive compatible direct
mechanisms respectively. The direct income functions, yl(¢) and yu(¢), are given by
w! yl(w) := minfy : y 2 projY©(w;C; z)g ;
and
w! yu(w) := max fy : y 2 projY©(w;C; z)g ;
where projY©(w;C; z) is the projection of the best response set ©(w;C; z) onto the
Y -axis. Since projY©(¢; C; z) is compact-valued and measurable, the existence of
the optimal measurable selectors, yl(¢) and yu(¢), is guaranteed by the Measurable
Maximum Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999), p. 570). The corresponding
direct tax functions, ¿ l(¢) and ¿u(¢), are then given by
w! ¿ l(w) := min©¿ : (yl(w); ¿) 2 Cª ;
and
w! ¿ u(w) := min f¿ : (yu(w); ¿) 2 Cg :
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Next, for a given (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C; z) de…ne the function w! U(w; z) as follows:
U(w; z) := u(w; y(w); ¿ (w); z),
and observe that
U(w; z) = u(w; y0(w); ¿ 0(w); z) for all (y 0(¢); ¿ 0(¢)) 2 §(C; z):
Finally, de…ne the following set-valued mapping: for all w 2W ,
¡(w) :=
©
(y; ¿ ) 2 K : yl(w) · y · yu(w) and u(w; y; ¿ ; z) = U(w; z)ª :
For each agent type w 2 W , ¡(w) contains the income and tax liability combi-
nations, with income levels between yl(w) and yu(w), lying on the type w agent’s
indi¤erence curve passing through (yl(w); ¿ l(w)) and (yu(w); ¿u(w)). By the con-
tinuity and tax monotonicity of utility functions ([A-3](1) and [A-3](4)) ¡(¢) takes
nonempty, closed values. Moreover, the mapping ¡(¢) is §-measurable (see Aliprantis
and Border (1999), Chapter 17).
Our objective in this part of the proof is to show that capacity constrained single
crossing implies that
u(w;¡(w); z) ¸ u(w;¡(w0); z) for all w and w0 in W; (26)
where
u(w;¡(w0); z) = max fu(w; y; ¿ ; z) : (y; ¿ ) 2 ¡(w0) \K(w)g : (27)
Note that
u(w;¡(w); z) = u(w; y; ¿; z) for all (y; ¿ ) 2 ¡(w).
Let
ªw(w0) = f(y; ¿) 2 ¡(w0) : u(w; y; ¿; z) = u(w;¡(w0); z)g : (28)
Note also that for all w and w0 in W , ªw(w0) is a nonempty closed subset of ¡(w0):
Suppose now that (26) fails. In particular, suppose that for some w and w0 in W ,
u(w;¡(w0); z) > u(w;¡(w); z): (29)
Inequality (29) implies that,
(i) (y(w0); ¿(w0)) =2 ªw(w0) for all (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C; z).
Otherwise, if for some (y(¢); ¿ (¢)) 2 §(C; z), (y(w0); ¿ (w0)) 2 ªw(w0), then inequality
(29) and the de…nition of the mapping ¡(¢) imply that
u(w; y(w0); ¿(w0); z) > u(w; y(w); ¿ (w); z);
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contradicting the fact that (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(C; z). Moreover, (29) together with as-
sumption [A-4], essentiality of leisure, imply that
(ii) y < m(w) for all (y; ¿ ) 2 ªw(w0):
Let (y0; ¿ 0) 2 ªw(w0). Suppose w0 > w. By observations (ii) and (iii) above, yl(w0) <
y0 <m(w). Thus, (yl(w0); ¿ l(w0)) is contained in ¡(w0) \K(w) but not contained in
ªw(w0). Thus, we have
u(w; y0; ¿ 0; z) > u(w; y l(w0); ¿ l(w0); z):
By capacity constrained single crossing, [A-6],
u(w0; y0; ¿ 0; z) > u(w0; yl(w0); ¿ l(w0); z);
contradicting the fact that (y 0; ¿ 0) and (yl(w0); ¿ l(w0)) are in ¡(w0).
Next, suppose w0 < w. By [A-6], m(w0) · m(w) (i.e., K(w0) µ K(w)). Thus,
we have ¡(w0) \K(w) = ¡z(w0) and by observation (i), ªw(w0) is a proper subset of
¡(w0) with yl(w0) < y0 < yu(w0) for all (y0; ¿ 0) 2 ªw(w0):We have
u(w0; yu(w0); ¿ u(w0); z) ¸ u(w0; y0; ¿ 0; z):
In fact, u(w0; yu(w0); ¿ u(w0); z) = u(w0; y0; ¿ 0; z) because (yu(w0); ¿ u(w0)) and (y0; ¿ 0)
are in ¡(w0). By capacity constrained single crossing [A-6]
u(w; yu(w0); ¿ u(w0); z) ¸ u(w; y 0; ¿ 0; z);
contradicting the fact that (y0; ¿ 0) 2 ªw(w0) and (yu(w0); ¿ u(w0)) 2 ¡(w0)nªw(w0) (see
observation (ii) above).
(1) PART 2: Let
C¡ = cl ([w¡(w) ) and D = C [C¡,
where cl denotes closure. Also, let
§(¡(¢)) denote the set of all §-measurable selections from the mapping ¡(¢).
Our objective in this part of the proof is to show that
§(D; z) = §(¡(¢)).
Let (y(¢); ¿ (¢)) 2 §(D; z), but suppose (y(¢); ¿(¢)) =2 §(¡(¢)). Thus, for some
w 2 W , (y(w); ¿ (w)) =2 ¡(w): Let (y; ¿ ) 2 ¡(w). Since (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(D; z) and
¡(w) ½ D, we have
u(w; y(w); ¿ (w); z) ¸ u(w; y; ¿ ; z);
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and since (y(w); ¿ (w)) =2 ¡(w), it must be true that
u(w; y(w); ¿ (w); z) > u(w; y; ¿ ; z):
If (y(w); ¿(w)) 2 C¡, then by continuity [A-3](1) and closure (i.e., the fact that
C¡ = cl ([w¡(w) )) there exists (y0; ¿ 0) 2 [w¡(w) such that
u(w; y 0; ¿ 0; z) > u(w; y; ¿ ; z):
Let (y0; ¿ 0) 2 ¡(w0) for some w0 6= w: Given that u(w; y 0; ¿ 0; z) > u(w; y; ¿ ; z), we have
by the essentiality of leisure [A-4] that
(y 0; ¿ 0) 2 ¡(w0) \K(w):
This implies that
u(w;¡(w0); z) > u(w;¡(w); z),
contradicting (26) established above.
If (y(w); ¿(w)) 2 C, then (y(w); ¿ (w)) 2 ©(w;C; z): We have
u(w; yl(w); ¿ l(w); z) = u(w; y(w); ¿ (w); z) > u(w; y; ¿ ; z) = u(w; y l(w); ¿ l(w); z);
a contradiction. Recall that (yl(¢); ¿ l(¢)) 2 §(C; z) is the minimum income, incentive
compatible direct mechanism in §(C; z): Thus, we must conclude that
(y(w); ¿ (w)) 2 ¡(w);
and therefore that
§(D; z) µ §(¡(¢)):
Let (y(¢); ¿ (¢)) 2 §(¡(¢)). In order to show that (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(D; z), we must
show that for all w 2W
u(w; y(w); ¿(w); z) = max fu(w; y; ¿; z) : (y; ¿) 2 D \K(w)g := bu(w;D; z):
We have for all w 2W , (y(w); ¿(w)) 2 D \K(w). Thus,
u(w; y(w); ¿ (w); z) · max fu(w; y; ¿ ; z) : (y; ¿ ) 2 D \K(w)g :
Suppose that for some w 2W
u(w; y(w); ¿ (w); z) < max fu(w; y; ¿; z) : (y; ¿) 2 D \K(w)g : (30)
Let (y; ¿ ) 2 D \K(w) be such that
u(w; y; ¿; z) = max fu(w; y; ¿; z) : (y; ¿) 2 D \K(w)g := bu(w;D; z):
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Inequality (30), together with the de…nition of the mapping ¡(¢), imply that (y; ¿) =2 C
and in particular that
(y; ¿) 2 ((C¡ \ K(w))nC) ½ D \K(w):
Moreover, by [A-4], the essentiality of leisure, y < m(w). By continuity [A-3](1) and
closure (i.e., the fact that C¡ = cl ([w¡(w) )) there exists (y0; ¿ 0) 2 ¡(w0) for some
w0 6= w such that
u(w; y(w); ¿(w); z) < u(w; y 0; ¿ 0; z):
But this implies that
u(w;¡(w); z) < u(w;¡(w0); z),
contradicting (26) established above. Thus, (y(¢); ¿(¢)) 2 §(D; z) and we conclude
that
§(D; z) = §(¡(¢)).
Given the de…nition of the mapping w! ¡(w) and the fact that §(D; z) = §(¡(¢)),
we conclude that bu(w;C; z) = bu(w;D; z) for all w 2W:
(2) Next we show thatZ
W
©(w;D; z)d´(w) is tax convex.
Let (Y 1; T 1) and (Y 2; T 2) be in
R
W ©(w;D; z)d´(w) and let
T¸ = (1¡ ¸)T 1 + ¸T 2:
Also, let (y1(¢); ¿ 1(¢)) and (y2(¢); ¿ 2(¢)) in §(D; z) be such that
T 1 =
Z
W
¿ 1(w)d´(w) and T 2 =
Z
W
¿2(w)d´(w):
By the continuity of utility functions, [A-3](1), for each w 2 W the set ¡(w) is tax
convex ; that is, the projection of ¡(w) onto the tax liability axis (i.e., the ¿ axis) is
a closed interval. Let
¿¸(¢) = (1 ¡ ¸)¿1(¢) + ¸¿ 2(¢);
and de…ne the set-valued mapping ¨(¢) as follows:
¨(w) :=
©
y 2 [y l(w); yu(w)] : u(w; y; ¿¸(w); z) = u(w; y1(w); ¿ 1(w); z)ª :
By the tax convexity of ¡(w) for each w 2 W , ¨(w) is nonempty. Moreover, since
the mapping ¨(¢) is §-measurable and closed-valued, it follows from the Kuratowski-
Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999), pages 563 and
567) that there exists an §-measurable function, y¸(¢), such that
y¸(w) 2 ¨(w) for all w 2W .
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Thus,
(y¸(¢); ¿ ¸(¢)) 2 §(¡(¢)) = §(D; z);
and
(Y¸; T¸) =
¡R
W y¸(w)d´(w);
R
W ¿¸(w)d´(w)
¢ 2 RW ©(w;D; z)d´(w) .
(3) Finally, we show thatZ
W
©(w;C; z)d´(w) µ
Z
W
©(w;D; z)d´(w). (31)
But (31) is an immediate consequence of the fact that
§(C; z) µ §(¡(¢)) = §(D; z):
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